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Introduction
The study of employment relations in Chile and Argentina has been the outcome of
research  in  various  disciplines  particularly  sociology,  political  science,  law,  and
history. This broadly defined scholarship has followed similar lines of analysis in both
countries, reflecting their parallel socio-economic transformations and corresponding
changes  in  employment  relations  actors  and  institutions.  From the  rise  of  import
substituting  industrialisation  and  developmentalist  populist  regimes  in  the  1930s,
which provided the base upon which ‘classic’ employment relations systems began to
take shape, to the crises and replacement of such regimes by military dictatorships and
the  introduction  of  neoliberalism  in  the  1970s,  which  redefined  the  relationship
between capital and labour.
A review of the literature has identified two main foci of study that roughly
overlap with these two socio-economic eras. A more traditional line of enquiry has
focused on the centrality of labour movements in the making of history, politics and
socio-economic development  of each country  and has  been particularly  concerned
with examining the shifting relations  between trade unions, the state,  and political
parties. A more contemporary focus of study has concentrated on the imposition of
neoliberalism, transitions to democracy, labour reform as well as on the implications
of new managerial practices on the dynamics of employment relations. 
With regard to the first focus, the literature on Chilean employment relations
can be traced back to historians  working from a classic  Marxist  tradition  (Barría,
1971;  Jobet,  1951;  Ramírez  Necochea,  1956;  Segall,  1953).1 They  centred  on
organised workers –particularly the industrial  and mining proletariat-  whose social
1 The citations included within this section are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to 
provide an exhaustive overview of the literatures in question.
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consciousness and collective action was essentially conceived of as autonomous and
socio-political.  Sociologists  and  political  scientists  questioned  the  revolutionary,
conscious, and transformative nature of Chilean workers presented by historians, and
concentrated instead on explaining the relationship between trade union action and
political action (Angell, 1972; Di Tella et al., 1966; Landsberger et al., 1964; Petras
and  Zeitlin,  1967).  In  parallel,  a  more  conventional  literature  has  kept  record  of
traditional  ‘industrial  relations’  data  including  union  membership  and  density,
collective bargaining, and industrial conflict (Frías, 1993; Morris and Oyadener, 1967;
Pizarro, 1986).
In Argentina, labour historians and sociologists have often concentrated on the
dynamics of trade unionism analysing cases of mobilisation, trade union development
and organisation, and the role of the state in these processes, trying to disentangle the
complexity of the relations between trade union and Peronism (Atzeni and Ghigliani,
2009; Doyon, 2006; James, 1990; Torre, 1988). Political scientists have looked at the
role of trade unions in shaping the government’s political agenda towards forms of
‘corporatism’ (Drake, 1996) or ‘neo-corporatism’ (Etchemendy and Collier, 2007), as
well as their interaction with political parties (Levitsky, 2005).
In terms of the second focus, studies on the imposition and impact of neo-
liberal  restructuring  on  Chilean  employment  relations  have  been  extensive  and
covered  a  broad  range  of  issues.  Studies  have  analysed  the  socio-economic
transformations  carried  out  by  the  Pinochet  dictatorship  (Collins  and  Lear,  1995;
Silva,  1996b) and the nature and dynamics  of  trade unionism under  military  rule
(Campero and Cortázar,  1985; Ruiz-Tagle,  1989).  Research has also discussed the
socio-economic record of the democratic regime (Drake and Jaksic, 1999; Martínez, J.
and Díaz, 1996), labour and capital’s role in the transition to democracy and the issue
of  social  concertation  (Frank,  2004;  Silva,  1996a),  as  well  as  the  nature  of
employment relations legislation and labour reform (Durán-Palma et al., 2005; Frank,
2002a;  Haagh,  2002;  López,  2004).  During  the  late  1990s  and  2000s,  numerous
studies have looked at the emergence of new categories of workers as a result of an
increasingly flexible and precarious labour market (Echeverría, 1997; Soto Roy, 2008;
Winn, 2004), as well as the changing nature of worker and employer collective action
(Abarzúa,  2008;  Arriagada,  2004;  Durán-Palma  and  López,  2009;  Monckeberg,
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2001),  collective bargaining  (González,  1998; Montero et  al.,  2000),  technological
change, and work organisation (Agacino et al., 1998; De Laire, 1999).
In the case of Argentina,  research includes  the study of changes  in  labour
market  dynamics  and  the  growth  of  the  informal  sector  (Piva,  2005;  Villanueva,
1997), trade union crisis and changes in employment relations (Fernández and Bisio,
1999;  Novick,  2001),  trade union resistance to  privatisation  (Ghigliani,  2010),  the
introduction of flexible working at firm level (Martínez, Ó., 1994), industrial conflict
(Íñigo  Carrera,  2007),  the  organisation  of  the  unemployed  movement  (Dinersein,
2001), as well as inter-union alliances and competition as a result of market reforms
(Murillo, 2001). More recently, and following the post 2001 economic recovery, new
studies  have  looked  at  aspects  of  union  renewal  (Atzeni  and  Ghigliani,  2007),
workers’ resistance (Lenguita and Montes Cató, 2008), and grass-root democracy and
workers representation (Vocos, 2010).
Despite these two potentially converging research trends, comparative studies
of  Chile  and  Argentina  have  been  unusual.  Although  these  two  countries  have
occasionally featured together in edited publications at regional level (some past and
contemporary examples include Alexander, 1962; Bergquist, 1986; Cook, 1998, 2002,
2007;  Drake,  1996;  Etchemendy,  2004;  Falabella,  1989;  Marshall,  2006;  Munck,
1994),  direct  (paired)  comparison  between  them has  been extremely  rare.  This  is
particularly surprising given that Chile and Argentina share a common historical and
cultural heritage, the world’s third-longest international border, and parallel patterns
of socio-economic development, but nonetheless show a number of country specific
differences and adaptations in their employment relations systems. 
In  this  chapter  we  aim  to  provide  a  modest  introduction  to  the  main
similarities  and differences  in employment  relations  between Chile  and Argentina.
The  first  section  provides  a  historical  account  of  these  countries’  traditional
employment  relations  in  the  context  of  import-substituting  industrialisation.  The
second  section  discusses  the  nature  and  impact  of  the  imposition  of  neoliberal
restructuring. The third section focuses on novel worker responses to the increasing
divide between formal and informal employment. A short conclusion will follow.
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Industrialisation, trade unions and employment relations
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and to lesser extent Chile, became regional leaders in the
process  of  import  substituting  industrialisation  (ISI)  that  characterised  the  ‘short
twentieth century’ in Latin America’s largest countries. In contrast to the hitherto over
reliance  on  laissez-faire and  primary  exports  for  the world  markets,  ISI  aimed to
‘develop industries oriented toward the domestic market by using trade restrictions
such as tariffs and quotas to encourage the replacement of imported manufactures by
domestic  products’  (Krugman  and  Obstfeld,  2003:  258).  While  there  were  strong
common variables involved, national variations particularly in terms of the origins of
ISI and the nature and timing of initial labour legislation, played a significant role in
shaping the character of what were to become these countries’ ‘traditional’ models of
employment relations.
In Chile, the breakdown of the  laissez-faire primary-export based pattern of
accumulation led to the incremental adoption of ISI as strategy to resume growth after
the Great Depression of 1929. Chile’s first labour code was enacted in 1931 on the
basis on piecemeal legislation passed in the 1920s. It was protective of the individual
employee,  instituted  fragmented  collective  bargaining  as  the  norm,  and  subjected
unions to the supervision of the state. In contrast to Chile’s more stable state-building
path  and  industrialisation  policy  (Silva,  2007),  ISI  in  Argentina  emerged  as  the
product of a narrow and unexpected alliance between trade unions, a small elite of
army  and  government  authorities,  and  some  domestic  industrialists,  and  was  not
initially  accompanied  by  the  introduction  of  an  organic  system  of  employment
relations.  Eventually,  this  alliance  evolved  into  a  national  political  movement,
Peronism,  that  led  industrialisation  and  built  a  vigorous  system  of  collective
employment relations in the 1940s and 1950s.
Strong labour movements emerged in Chile and Argentina during the ISI era.
This was mutually reinforcing as ISI created a concentrated industrial labour force
that was amenable to political  organisation,  while strong trade unions provided an
organised  mass  constituency  to  support  ISI  policies  (Roberts,  2002).  State-labour
relations in Chile and Argentina during ISI were characterised by the incorporation of
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labour movements. But while Chile became an example of state-incorporation with
governments aiming to control the labour movement, Argentina fell in the category of
political-party incorporation (Collier and Collier, 1991), evidencing variants of labour
mobilisation  by  strong  leftist  and  populist  political  parties  respectively  (Roberts,
2002). As a result, the Chilean labour movement turned into a political arena for the
struggles  of  Communists,  Socialists,  and  Christian  Democrats,  and  Argentina’s
became  the  ideological,  financial,  and  structural  base  of  Peronism  (Partido
Justicialista). 
Chile
The political corruption, economic laissez-faire, and strictly free, unregulated labour
market  that  characterised  the  period  that  followed  the  1891  Civil  War  began  to
breakdown in the late 1910s reflecting the ups and downs of Chile’s overdependence
on  nitrate  exports.  The  1920s  were  characterised  by  regular  economic  crises,
heightened  levels  of  industrial  conflict,  the  introduction  of  primitive  employment
relations legislation, and by a succession of short-lived governments proposing radical
alternatives  to  the  breakdown  of  the  model  of  ‘outward-oriented’  development
(Salazar, 2003). The 1930s constituted a critical juncture in Chile’s political economy
and development of employment relations institutions, as the progressive adoption of
ISI policies, the enactment of the 1925 Constitution, and the 1931 Labour Code began
to shape the milieu of political, economic and social adjustments known as ‘inward-
oriented’ development. 
After becoming one of the worst casualties of the Great Depression of 1929 –
with exports and imports decreasing 78% and 84% between 1929 and 1932 while the
world economy contracted ‘only’ by 25% (Pinto and Salazar, 2002)- consensus grew
stronger  on  the  need  for  the  state  to  promote  domestic  industry,  an  incremental
process that gained a definite impetus with the formal adoption of ISI by the Popular
Front  in  1938.  Complementary,  the  1925  Constitution  came  into  force  in  1932,
replacing  a  corrupted  pseudo-parliamentary  system  with  a  presidential  political
system that provided for the broad and solid political framework that would later back
the developmentalist state (Lucena and Covarrubias, 2006).
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Chile’s first labour code was enacted in 1931. A consolidation of early and
new  labour  legislation,  the  code  was  protective  of  the  individual  employee  and
characterised by extensive and highly detailed regulations. It distinguished between
blue-  and  white-collar  workers,  for  whom separate  social  security  schemes  were
created  (Cook, 1998; Mizala and Romaguera, 2001; Walker, 2002).  In line with this
distinction,  collective regulations instituted fragmented collective bargaining as the
norm and were restrictive of labour organisations, subjecting them to the supervision
of  the  state (Córdova,  1996).  State  intervention  was  particularly  evident  in  the
Ministry of Labour’s role in collective bargaining, from which unions had to secure
permission  before  negotiating,  supervised  their  finances,  and  run  an  obligatory
conciliation  service,  which  in  turn,  sanctioned  the  legality  or  illegality  of  strikes.
Blue- and white-collar workers were forbidden to join the same union, but had to
organise in industrial and professional unions respectively. For Roddick (1989: 203)
the fragmented character of the 1931 Labour Code ‘ultimately forced most of Chile’s
labour  movement  into  legally  differentiated  boxes,  bargaining  under  different
preconditions and with different institutional horizons’. 
Socialists and Communists identified with the Popular Front and participated
in government between 1938 and 1948. They committed to abide by the collective
bargaining  institutions  of  the  labour  code  and  to  observe  ‘social  peace’ while  in
government.  As a result,  the new system of employment relations  began to settle,
industrial conflict decreased considerably throughout the decade, and Socialists and
Communists became the dominant force within the labour movement to the expense
of their Anarchist rivals. 
The main characteristics of Chile’s ‘classic’ or ‘legal Marxist’ unionism began
to crystallise after the formation of CUT (Central Única de Trabajadores) in 1953, a
unification of all major confederations. Classic unionism was largely confrontational
in relation with employers  and favoured  organisation at  higher-levels.  Channelling
grievances through federations and confederations had socio-political  visibility and
helped  to  overcome  weak  bargaining  power  at  company-level.  In  this  context,
political  parties  performed  an  intermediary  role  between  unions  and  the  state  in
control of the employment relations system and as a result, Chile’s labour movement
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turned into  a political  arena for  the struggles  of Communist,  Socialists,  and later,
Christian Democrats. 
The diffuse differentiation between political parties and trade unions resulted
in a loss of autonomy of the latter in relation to the former. For some commentators,
classic unionism represented an expression of class struggle, but limited to economic
grievances  and subordinated  to  political  parties,  resulting  in  a  weak ‘autonomous
politisation’ of the labour movement in contrast to the highly militant politisation of
its  leadership.  For  others,  that  labour  strategy  developed in  this  way was a  mere
consequence  of  legal  restrictions,  and  the  resulting  overlapping  of  interests  with
parties of the left (Rojas and Aravena, 1999). That these and other characteristics are
widely considered to represent the labour movement in this period should not obscure
the fact that, as ever, the labour movement is a largely heterogeneous entity (Campero
and Cortázar, 1985). 
Despite  legally  induced  fragmentation,  organised  labour’s  traditional
indicators of power  and participation in the polity increased throughout the period of
inward-oriented  development.  Union  density  grew from 21% in  1940 to  its  29%
historical peak in 1973. Likewise, collective bargaining coverage rose to an average
of 13% of the occupied workforce between 1965 and 1970, decreasing slightly to 11%
between 1971 and 1973  (Mizala  and Romaguera,  2001).  Likewise,  the restrictions
governing strikes were not obstacle  for union mobilisation,  as industrial  conflict  –
albeit illegal- increased heavily during the 1960s (Pizarro, 1986). Furthermore, CUT
played  a  decisive  role  in  national  politics,  which  culminated  with  the  democratic
election of Salvador Allende and the Popular Unity coalition  in 1970. As socialist
reforms  deepened  however,  a  coalition  of  landowners,  middle  classes,  as  well  as
American  corporations  in  Chile began  a  series  of  destabilising  activities  and  an
economic blockade that fuelled political polarisation and social conflict ending in the
coup d’état of 11 September 1973 (US Department of State, 2000; US Senate, 1975). 
Argentina
The 1930s also hastened important economic and political changes in Argentina. The
political unrest generated by the Great Depression ended in a military coup d’état that
7
dramatically changed the country’s political situation, and gravely affected unions as
repression increased. While, the military government that followed had no interest in
nationalism  or  industrial  policy  (Silva,  2007),  ISI  emerged  from a  narrow  and
unexpected  alliance  between  trade  unions,  a  small  elite  of  army and  government
authorities, and some domestic industrialists. At this stage, ISI produced an expansion
of the working class and increase in unionisation, but was not accompanied by the
introduction of an organic system of employment relations. Although after the peak of
strikes of 1935-1936, the state gradually increased its role in labour disputes through
the  Departamento Nacional del Trabajo, employment relations continued to rest on
voluntarism until  the rise  of  Peronism a decade  later.  Until  then,  the Argentinean
labour  movement  faced  a  continuous  combination  of  political  exclusion  and
industrialisation without income redistribution, which fuelled growing working class
discontent.
The arrival of Colonel Perón at the Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión in 1943
and his two consecutive democratic presidencies (1945-1955) encouraged the political
integration of the labour movement, and brought about the emergence of a system of
state intervention and regulation of the capital-labour relationship. Between 1943 and
1955, both military  and democratic  authorities  backed union recognition,  enforced
previous  labour  laws,  promoted new legislation,  and actively  intervened in labour
conflicts,  collective  bargaining  and  social  security.  Argentina’s  labour  movement
became the ideological, financial, and structural base of Peronism.2 This development
was  at  the  expense  of  the  previous  influence  of  Anarchists,  Socialists  and
Communists, as the rise of Peronism ran parallel  to the growth of anti-communist
policies and oligarchic tendencies within the labour movement.
From the point of view of labour, the backbone of the system was the 1945
Law Decree on trade union organisation.  Inter alia, it established the monopoly of
labour representation in collective bargaining based on the legal recognition of the
union with the greatest number of members (personería gremial), and consolidated
the dominance of industry-wide trade unions  (Marshall,  2006). The law recognised
the right of workers to organise, granted the state influence on legal procedures and
2 However,  the  instability  of  the  parliamentary  system,  the  strong  development  of  workplace
organisations,  and  since  1980s,  the  de-unionisation  of  the  political  structures  of  the  Partido
Justicialista point to a less linear relationship between the state and the labour movement in Argentina.
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unions internal activities, gave employment protection to union officials, typified anti-
union practices, and supported trade union initiatives in social security. 
Union density reached its 48% historical peak in 1954 (Lamadrid and Orsatti,
1991). Unions were able to translate workers mobilisation into advantageous labour
contracts.  Important  union  demands  like  the  introduction  of  workplace  structures
(comisiones internas), the closed-shop, or financial benefits like pension schemes and
health services, were originally obtained by unions in collective agreements, and only
later incorporated into labour legislation. 
In 1944 and 1953, first by decree and then by special  legislation,  the state
encouraged collective bargaining, extended its coverage and secured the participation
of ministerial authorities on the bargaining table. Ever since, collective agreements are
valid  only if  approved by the Ministry of Labour  (homologación) and their  terms
extended to all workers in a particular industry or economic activity irrespective of
union membership. The state was granted and still maintains a powerful role as it can
refuse to validate and/or impose changes to a collective agreement. In practice, this
power is normally not used and instead parties usually seek ministerial advice and
approval before negotiating on sensible issues. 
It is important to note however, that between 1953 and 1988, trade unions and
employers  were able  to freely negotiate  collective agreements  during eleven years
only  as  both  military  and  democratic  governments  frequently  suspended  the
application of bargaining legislation.  Yet,  these collective agreements were able to
shape Argentina’s employment relations because of a legal disposition by which any
agreement  remains valid until  it  is  formally replaced or repealed (ultra-actividad).
The  resulting  juridification  of  employment  relations  placed  regulatory  public
institutions  at  the  centre  of  the  system,  made  politics  pivotal  to  its  practice,  and
certainly contributed to the development of bureaucratic leaderships incorporated into
the Peronist  movement.  Ultimately,  this  led to the Workers General Confederation
(Confederación General del Trabajo - CGT) and other trade union political bodies
like the 62 Organizaciones Peronistas, to engage in a sort of political exchange with
different governments whenever the chance arose. 
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Nevertheless,  this  juridification  did  not  reach  the  workplace  to  the  same
extent, because the rank-and-file were able to build up strong and lively workplace
structures between 1946 and 1955. The  comisiones internas became,  and still  are,
determinant  in  defending  workers’  interests,  particularly  in  terms  of  making
employers observe the terms of collective agreements.
Peronist legislation also encouraged the institutionalisation of union-provided
health  care  for  workers  and  their  families,  perhaps  the  most  salient  feature  of
Argentinean trade unions. The obras sociales were created in the late 1950s and early
1960s  through  collective  agreements  with  employers  and  although  both  sides
contribute to financing these schemes, their administration was reserved to the unions.
In  1970,  employers  and  unions  were  legally  obliged  to  create  and  extend  obras
sociales to non-unionised workers in the same industry. As a result, a worker was able
to  pay  obra  social dues  without  becoming  a  union  member,  strengthening  union
finances and protecting them against free riders in collective bargaining. The obras
sociales have become one of the pillars of the country’s health system, and as such a
source of power and an axis of political exchange for the unions.
The significance of these various institutions for the strength of the Argentine
labour  movement  is  evident  when considering  that  every  single attempt  to  curtail
trade  unions  power,  by  both  military  and  civil  governments  since  1955,  has
manifested  in  an  open  attack  to  their  legal  basis,  the  institutions  of  collective
bargaining, the  comisiones internas, and since 1970, the union control of the  obras
sociales. 
The continuing effects of neoliberal restructuring on employment relations
By  the  mid-1970s,  Chile  and  Argentina  began  to  abandon  ISI  and  impose
neoliberalism  under  harsh  military  dictatorships.  The  military  rejected  ISI’s  high
levels  of  state  involvement  in  the  economy,  protectionism,  and  inclusive  social
policies.  As  they  brutally  repressed  the  labour  movement,  authoritarian  regimes
imposed  policies  oriented  to  facilitate  the  role  of  the  market  through  trade
liberalisation, capital market deregulation, privatisation, and a dismantling of labour
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regulations.  But  as  Cook  (2002,  2007) has  extensively  discussed,  the  nature  and
sequence of the ‘dual transitions’ that have characterised the last three decades -from
ISI to neoliberalism, and from dictatorship back to democracy- have differed greatly
between the two countries. 
Chile  experienced  market  reforms  before  democratic  transition.  Neoliberal
restructuring  and the  revamp of  labour  legislation  were  largely  consolidated  by  a
dictatorship able to suppress most forms of resistance.  Since 1990, the democratic
governments  of the  Concertación have maintained the majority  of socio-economic
policies originally associated with Pinochet, within a largely stable political setting
and  expanding  economy.  In  contrast,  Argentina  experienced  democratic  transition
before consolidating market economic reforms. Although the latter were initiated by
the military  between 1976 and 1982,  they were questioned during the democratic
transition (1983-1989). Indeed, the bulk of Argentinean neoliberal restructuring was
introduced by the  civilian  government  of Carlos  Menem during the 1990s,  in  the
midst of political confrontation and economic and social turmoil. 
This has had significant, albeit contrasting, consequences for the direction and
politics of labour law reform in both countries under their democratic regimes. While
the direction of labour reform in Chile was protective reflecting efforts to redress the
legacy of the dictatorship, labour reform in Argentina was characterised by attempts to
flexibilise and reverse earlier labour protections  (Cook, 1998). Nevertheless, current
employment  relations  systems  have  neither  gained  an  exclusively  protective  nor
flexible  character  respectively.  Indeed,  the nature  of  Chile’s  employment  relations
remains essentially flexible while Argentina’s may be described between flexibility
and protection (Cook, 1998).
The consolidation of structural reforms during the 1990s was achieved through
the intervention of labour-supported coalitions and political  parties. In Chile,  CUT
supported the  Concertación and engaged in social  concertation  with the state  and
employers, accepting and legitimising the bulk of neo-liberal model in exchange for
meagre  labour  reforms.  In  Argentina,  the  CGT showed  an  ambivalent  attitude  to
Menem’s  Peronist  government,  supporting  individual  reforms  oriented  to  labour
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flexibility in exchange for protection for trade unions’ traditional organisational and
financial structures. 
As a result of neoliberal restructuring, both countries now show high levels of
atypical employment, precariousness, informality, and inequality. In contrast, there is
a  significant  difference  between  Chile  and  Argentina  terms  of  collective  labour
relations.  In  Chile,  effective  collective  representation  has  become  a  rarity  with
stagnant or declining levels of unionisation and collective bargaining. In Argentina,
union density  and coverage  among unionisable  workers  remains  high,  and unions
remain  financially  and  politically  powerful.  Moreover,  while  the  outcomes  of
bargaining tend to be modest in Chile, the opposite is currently the case in Argentina. 
Chile
After  a  short  period of  policy indecision,  the Pinochet  regime (1973-1990) began
implementing  neoliberal  restructuring  in  1975,  imposing  draconian  stabilisation
programmes, privatisation, and the rapid, thorough liberalisation of capital markets,
prices, and trade (Silva, 1996a). Given the perceived success of the policies, market
logic began to expand into most key areas of social policy in the late 1970s, including
health, pensions, and the revamp of employment relations legislation.
Individual legislation was first reformed in 1978 when the regime derogated
protective  norms  imposing  in  effect  a  ‘neoliberal  approach  to  flexibility’,
characterised  by  a  downward  adjustment  of  terms  of  employment,  quantitatively
through wage cutting and substandard contracts, and qualitatively as the restoration of
managerial authority (Streeck, 1987). Collective labour relations were re-regulated in
1979 through a series of acts designed to weaken unions as bargaining agents and
centred on preventing collective action from having an effect on the labour market
(Valenzuela,  1989).  The 1979 Labour Plan –strictly  speaking a  ‘trade union plan’
according to his author (Piñera, 1990)- re-legalised trade unionism but limited union
activity  exclusively  to  the  level  of  the  firm,  set  strict  limits  to  union  power,
decentralised  collective  bargaining  completely,  restricted  the  right  to  strike,  and
reduced the role of the state in employment relations.
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Although  the  immediate  result  of  the  plan  was  the  resurfacing  of  union
organisations,  over  time  it  institutionalised  a  fragile  and  fragmented  unionism.
Nevertheless, (illegal) national level organisations were able to reorganise and played
a  decisive  in  the  plebiscite  that  led  to  the  recovery  of  democracy  in  1990.  The
Concertación, a labour-supported centre-left coalition led by Christian Democrats and
Socialists, remained in power until 2010. 
Deepening democracy,  reforming the ‘predatory,  dependent,  and excluding’
economic model, and reforming the regime’s employment relations legal framework
(‘no  democracy  without  labour  reform’)  were  all  in  the  Concertación’s  agenda.
Fearful of a conservative backlash and showing significant doses of pragmatism in a
expanding economy however, the Concertación quickly backed away from any plan
to substantially change Chile’s neoliberal socioeconomic model. Instead, the coalition
pledged to reduce the social deficit accumulated under military rule and committed
itself  to  foster  “growth  with  equity”  within  the  ‘protective’ political  framework
inherited from the dictatorship (Durán-Palma et al., 2005).
In this context, compromise and moderation were argued by the government
as the most effective way to achieve concessions from militant employers and a strong
opposition  in  reforming  employment  relations  legislation.  Aylwin’s  government
(1990–1993)  sought  to  promote  social  concertation  at  national  level  among  the
government,  CUT,  and the  main  employers’ association,  the  CPC.  In  this  period,
broad  tripartite  agreements  were  signed  and  various  laws  passed  which  later
consolidated into the 1994 Labour Code. By the mid-1990s, tripartism was abandoned
as  it  had  actually  turned  into  bilateral  exchanges  between  the  government  and
employers (Silva, 1996a).
By the end of the Frei administration (1994–1999), labour reform had become
a hot political issue. Reforms were introduced and blocked in the Senate during the
1999 presidential elections, which arguably helped the coalition to stay in power. The
Lagos  government  (2000-2006)  passed  weakened  reforms  in  2001.  The  last
Concertación administration (Bachelet, 2006-2010) was also elected in the midst of
another ‘hot employment relations summer’ (see next section). 
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Social concertation and labour reform have delivered meagre results. While
the  1994  and  2001  reforms  reduced  the  repressive  character  of  authoritarian
legislation, many emblematic changes had provisions that contributed in practice to
preserving the essentially flexible and restrictive character of labour legislation. This
is not to say that reforms have not encouraged pluralism and improved the level of
social  protection  for  the  most  vulnerable,  but  that  the  enjoyment  of  labour  rights
typically associated with ‘advanced’ employment relations systems remains limited
(Durán-Palma et al., 2005; Frank, 2002a).
Research explaining the failure of social concertation and the limitations of
labour  reform have  highlighted  several  factors  (Durán-Palma et  al.,  2005;  Frank,
2002a,  2002b;  Haagh,  2002).  Perhaps  the  most  evident  have  to  do  with  the
institutional compromises made as a result of the early transition process, the political
right’s recalcitrant opposition to reform, and employers’ lack of interest in fostering
better relations with labour  (Frank, 2004). More important however, it has been the
progressive  identification  of  the  Concertación with  neoliberalism,  which  has
constrained the possibility of systemic reform  inter alia in the area of employment
relations because cheap and flexible labour with few rights to collective action are
critical to the model, and have indeed been central to the recovery and expansion of
Chilean capitalism (Taylor, 2004). But the resilience of the model has also been the
result of a weakened labour movement and its strategic choices. Due to its close ties
with the Concertación, the CUT gave priority to the consolidation of democracy over
class struggle and the organisational needs of the labour movement (Frank, 2004).
As a result, ‘a conspicuous tension remains in the discrepancy between the
Concertación’s  rhetorical  commitment  to  “growth  with  equity”  and  the  reality  of
pronounced  social  polarisation’  (Taylor,  2004:  76).  Nearly  36% of  Chile’s  labour
force  works  today  in  the  informal  sector  (Tokman,  2007).  Low  incentives  for
unionisation  and  collective  bargaining  have  also  rendered  effective  collective
representation a rarity. Union density as percentage of wage and salary earners in the
private sector has declined from its post-dictatorship peak of 21% in 1992, to 15% in
2007 (Dirección del Trabajo, 2008a). In 2006, 68% of workers work in firms with no
unions (Pulso, 2007). Likewise, the percentage of workers participating in collective
bargaining each year has declined from 10% in 1991 to a mere 6% in 2007 (Dirección
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del Trabajo, 2008b). Moreover, the outcomes of collective bargaining have worsened
with  wage  improvements  ‘uncomfortably  close  to  the  level  of  inflation’  (Frank,
2002b: 11). 
Argentina
Neoliberal restructuring was also introduced in Argentina by a military dictatorship
(1976-1983).The military opened the economy to foreign capitals, reoriented the role
of the state, and promoted a series of financial reforms increasing the public debt and
the  dependence  on  international  financial  institutions  (IFI).  In  contrast  to  Chile
however,  Argentina’s  first  democratic  government  (Alfonsín,  1983-1988) softened,
and  even  questioned  the  neo-liberal  turn.  Unions  were  able  to  obtain  prolabour
reforms and secured rights that were enshrined in labour law. 
Market  reforms were only consolidated  during  the  government  of  Peronist
Carlos  Menem  (1989-1999)  elected  under  severe  economic  conditions,  a
hyperinflationary  crisis,  and  the  pressure  of  IFI.  Menem’s  ‘Convertibility  Plan’
increased  public  debt  to  maintain  an  anti-inflationary  peso-dollar  parity,  making
Argentina even more dependent on IFI. The plan also involved a radical reform of the
state including the privatisation of state-owned utilities and enterprises, reduction of
public spending, decentralisation, and tendering. 
Menen’s  reforms  certainly  involved  reversing  its  predecessor’s  short-lived
labour protections. Individual labour rights and collective bargaining were reformed
piecemeal  to  ease  the  introduction  of  flexible  contracts  and  working  practices,
producing devastating effects on employment and having a profound impact on the
employment relations system. The Peronist neo-liberal offensive threw trade unions
into  disarray.  Some powerful  organisations  supported  the  government,  giving  rise
around  the  CGT  to  an  ‘entrepreneurial  unionism’  mainly  focused  on  business
opportunities  to  strength  unions’ financial  resources,  ultimately  maintaining  core
interests linked to organisational survival and collective bargaining coverage. Other
organisations  contested  neo-liberal  policies  resulting  in  the  emergence  of  a  rival
confederation in 1992, the Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA), as well as
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of an oppositional faction within the CGT in 1994, the Movimiento de Trabajadores
Argentinos (MTA). 
Throughout the 1990s, flexibility became the leitmotif of employers and the
government.  Employers  introduced  flexibility  in  the  newly  privatised  utilities  and
enterprises, in a largely piecemeal fashion. Their offensive at firm level impacted on
four main areas: the legal nature of the employment relationship, wage determination,
distribution  of  working  hours,  and  the  definition  and  organisation  of  the  labour
process. 
The government sought flexibility by legal reform and collective bargaining.
Although eventually successful, it was a highly contested process. Between 1992 and
1999,  the  CGT,  the  CTA  and  the  MTA  launched  nine  general  strikes  against
governmental  policies.  During Menem’s first  term (1989–1995),  only eight  out  of
twenty bills to reform labour laws were passed in Parliament. This was mainly the
result of a number of Peronist MPs with union backgrounds who, despite the profound
de-unionisation  of  the  PJ,  were  able  to  block  legislative  initiatives  to  flexibilise
contracts. But after the government reached a corporative pact with the CGT in 1994,
these MPs stopped blocking neoliberal legislation. 
Indeed,  during  Menem’s  second  term  (1995-1999),  Argentina’s  traditional
centralised  system  of  national  collective  bargaining  was  reversed  by  favouring
collective negotiations at plant level in a bid to facilitate the introduction of flexibility.
This  certainly  debilitated  trade  unions’  bargaining  power,  but  in  exchange  for
introducing reforms -and to co-opt the CGT- the government increased protection and
financial  support  to  the  obras  sociales,  and  allowed  unions  to  invest  in  the  new
business  opportunities  brought  about  by  the  privatisation  and  deregulation  of  the
health, pensions, and industrial accidents insurance systems.
During the 1990s, neoliberal restructuring had a highly negative impact on the
labour market,  particularly in terms of the growth of the informal sector. Whereas
from 1992 to 1996 the rate of unregistered employees oscillated between 22 and 25%,
by the end of 2009, this figure stands at 36% (TEL, 2009). Increasing informalisation
translated into relative union demobilisation at local and industry level. But between
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1997 and 2002, informalisation was also responsible for activating an unprecedented
process of mass mobilisation led by the unemployed who began to organise in new
territorial  organisations.  These organisations  played an  important  role  in  the mass
protests that overthrew the government in December 2001 in the midst of a severe
economic crisis.
As  the  economy  began  to  recover  in  2003,  traditional  trade  unions  have
regained a prominent role. First, at 40%, union density among unionisable workers
remains very high for Latin American standards. Second, the number of collective
agreements  has  increased  from 348 in  2004  to  1231 in  2008,  covering  the  great
majority of workers employed in the formal sector. In 2005, for instance, although
union density in formal sector enterprises stood at 37%, 90% of them signed some
type of agreement with a trade union, covering 83% of their workforce (Trajtemberg
and  Attorresi,  2005).  Third,  even  though  flexibility  has  not  been  reversed,  some
unions have been able to obtain important benefits in areas including working-hours,
pay,  outsourcing,  and  health.  Last,  while  decentralisation  of  collective  bargaining
remains high, the tendency is to favour national sector agreements and to coordinate
these  by  linking  wage  increases  in  less  dynamic  sectors  where  unions  have  less
bargaining power with those obtained by more powerful and representative unions. 
Neo-liberalism, mobilisation, and evolving forms of collective action
Analyses like the above, based largely on traditional actors, national level, and formal
regulations, run the risk of overlooking interesting developments occurring elsewhere,
particularly in terms of the increasing diversity in struggles and evolving forms of
collective action. These can be observed in Chile and Argentina, partly as a result of a
constant  tension  between  the  rank-and-file  and  trade  union  confederations
legitimising (or weakly opposing) neo-liberal restructuring. They suggest a renewed
potential for contestation in both countries, but the nature of the most relevant of these
experiences vary greatly.
In Chile, CUT engaged in social dialogue with the state and employers, and
accepted  the legitimacy of  neo-liberalism in exchange for meagre  labour  reforms.
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With the exception of some public and strategic sector unions, rank-and-file militancy
was largely contained within the system or marginalised throughout the 1990s and
early  2000s.  However,  increasing  signs  of  discontent  and  significant  pockets  of
resistance can be observed, particularly amongst workers in the ‘rough end’ of the
labour market,  particularly those working in outsourced employment relationships.
Increasingly successful ‘contract labour unions’ have organised within the system but
mobilised outside it, achieving remarkable gains.
In Argentina, the CGT showed an ambivalent attitude to Menem’s neoliberal
reforms, exchanging labour flexibility for protection for trade unions’ organisational
and  financial  structures.  But  this  strategy  produced  growing  tensions,  the
fragmentation  of  workers’  centrals,  and  hesitant  tactics,  which  included  bitter
industrial action. Until 2002, all these contradictions caused workers’ demobilisation
and  the  rise  of  alternative  forms  of  collective  action,  mainly  by  organisations  of
unemployed  workers  outside  trade  union’s  domain.  Since  2003  however,  the
resurgence  of  industrial  conflict  has  concentrated  on,  and  been  accompanied  by
radical grass-root experiences, which have questioned the top-down oligarchic control
of most traditional trade unions. 
Chile
No other group of workers has come closer to symbolise the precarious state of the
Chilean  labour  market  than  contract  workers  (subcontratistas).3 Contract  workers
labour  in  outsourced  employment  relationships  occupying  the  frontier  between
formality and informality.4 This is because more often than not, outsourcing is used to
intentionally disguise the employment relationship that  de facto exists between user
enterprises and contract workers. User enterprises are not obliged to observe labour
legislation with regard to workers legally employed by a third party and, in this way,
reducing  labour  costs  while  remaining  in  control  of  the  employment  relationship
(Durán-Palma and López, 2009). Contract workers earn significantly less than ‘direct’
3 This section draws liberally from Durán-Palma (2009) and Durán-Palma and López (2009).
4 Outsourcing (subcontratación) refers herein to triangular employment relationships where a worker
(‘contract worker’) employed by an enterprise (the ‘provider’) performs work for a third party (the
‘user’) to whom their employer provides labour or services (ILO, 2006). It should not be confused with
the supply of labour under commercial contracts.
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workers  performing  work  of  equal  value,  labour  in  relatively  unsafe  working
conditions,  and  present  low  levels  of  unionisation  and  collective  bargaining
(Echeverría,  2006).  Unsurprisingly,  outsourced  employment  has  been  generally
characterised as precarious and contract workers are widely seen and see themselves
as second-class labour force. 
Outsourcing  in  Chile  has  increased  rapidly  as  large  user  enterprises  have
developed extensive networks based on the contracting out of labour and/or services,
provided  by  numerous  small  and  medium  enterprises.  In  2007  over  half  of  all
companies  outsourced at  least  one function and 35% of all  workers in the formal
sector work under outsourced employment contracts  (Dirección del Trabajo,  2007;
Pulso, 2007).
Outsourcing  remained  poorly  regulated  until  the  presidential  elections  of
December 2005 installed the ‘contract labour question’ on top of the political agenda.
Unions  representing  contract  workers  labouring  for  state-giant  CODELCO
(Corporación del Cobre de Chile),  the world’s largest  copper producer,  conducted
massive mobilisations demanding better employment and working conditions. In early
2006, the incumbent Lagos government re-introduced a Bill on Outsourcing dormant
in Congress since 2001. After a rocky legislative process, newly elected President
Michelle  Bachelet  promulgated  the Outsourcing  and Supply of  Labour  Act  on 16
October  2006,  claiming  that  it  represented  ‘a  definite,  decisive,  and clear  step  in
terminating  with  the  division  between  first  and  second  class  workers’  (Bachelet,
2006). 
Immediately after the Act came into force on 16 January 2007, the National
Labour  Bureau  began  a  comprehensive  plan  of  labour  inspections.  The  Bureau
detected numerous irregularities involving disguised employment relationships and, in
a series of emblematic rulings, demanded user enterprises to internalise thousands of
contract workers. Whereas some employers began to diligently employ these workers,
many others successfully challenged in court the Bureau’s competency to rule on such
matters. 
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As the Bureau’s position was undermined and employer opposition to the Act
grew stronger, a sudden wave of labour discontent, mass mobilisation,  and violent
industrial conflict began to engulf the country.  Hitherto a largely invisible majority,
contract workers in flagship commodity export sectors began solid mass mobilising
drives in late 2005. Unions of contract workers particularly in the copper mining and
forestry sectors did not confine themselves to demand new legislation, or to try to
engage in firm-level negotiations, which they had got painfully used to lose. Instead,
they chose to organise contract workers across provider enterprises, and to mobilise
outside formal institutional channels to put direct pressure on user enterprises. This
ultimately  allowed  them  to  bargain  from  a  position  of  strength  and  to  achieve
remarkable  gains,  setting  a  bargaining  pattern  throughout  the  forestry  sector  and
forcing the state-owned copper mining sector to improve employment and working
conditions.  In  2009,  top  leaders  of  the  now  called  ‘contract  labour  movement’
(movimiento obrero subcontratista) successfully bid for top positions in CUT.
Although still early to establish the long-term significance of these events, it
seems  that  qualitatively  different  period  in  Chile’s  employment  relations  may  be
emerging. While the neoliberal establishment has been able to resist challenges from
above by employing constitutional prerogatives and relying on the hegemony of the
ruling  elite,  it  has  appeared  far  less  prepared  to  contain  the  direct  challenge
represented by subordinate forces mobilising outside institutional channels. Indeed, it
is the first time since the return of democracy that rank-and-file labour mobilisation
appears to be the main drive for changes in Chilean employment relations.
Argentina
The main and long lasting effect of the processes of privatisation, downsizing and
outsourcing of the 1990s in Argentina, has been the segregation of an important part
of  the  population  into  a  secondary  labour  market.  In  contrast  to  Chile  however,
traditional  union  organisations  have  recovered  their  importance,  particularly  since
2003.
Certain analyses have explained the resilience of traditional unions employing
the concept  of ‘segmented  neo-corporatism’.  Etchemendy and Collier  (2007:  366)
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have described it as ‘a pattern of peak-level negotiation in which monopolistic unions,
business  associations,  and  the  government  coordinate  on  inflation-targeted,  sector
wide  wage  agreements  and  minimum  wage  floors,  which  apply  to  a  substantial
minority  of the labour  force’.  According to  this  logic,  segmented corporatism has
helped large portions of formal workers to recover wage levels and to strengthen the
role of the CGT, but also to simultaneously reinforce the divide between formal and
informal workers. 
Even if analytically useful to explain the resilience and limits of traditional
union power  in  Argentina,  a  focus  on peak-level  negotiation  risks  losing  sight  of
important local and grass-root phenomena. Indeed, over the course of the last two
decades  there  have been important  changes  in  the  level,  type and composition  of
struggles, following the ups and downs of the economic cycle. Based on the decline in
the number of strikes relative to the total of social protests until 2002, some scholars
have  argued  the  demise  of  trade  unions  as  the  main  promoters  of  social  protest
(Farinetti, 2002). But disaggregated data shows that half of social protests recorded
between  1989  and  2002,  corresponded  to  union  initiatives,  although  strikes
represented  only  24%  of  them.  Moreover,  even  between  1997  and  2002,  when
organisations of unemployed workers led the most radical struggles, unions showed a
high level of unrest  (Schuster et al., 2006). It should not be surprising that with the
economy growing at  an average of  8% a year,  unemployment  diminishing,  and a
friendlier  political  environment,  private  sector  strikes  have  recovered  significantly
since 2003 (Atzeni and Ghigliani, 2007). But the state has tightened repression since
the second half of 2005, with police suppressing labour protests, sit-in strikes, and
factory occupations. 
Most importantly, the resurgence of labour activism in Argentina has featured
a  number  of  workplace  structures  across  several  economic  sectors,  including  the
Buenos Aires underground, hospitals, teachers, communications, airlines and workers
from  the  meat,  textile,  rubber,  metal,  and  food  processing  industries.  These
organisations  have  taken  industrial  action  mobilising  workers  through  grass-root
democracy structures and maintained lengthy conflicts with significant media impact
(Atzeni and Ghigliani, 2007). 
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They gained further momentum in 2009 when Buenos Aires underground and
Kraft-food workers led a series of collective actions that questioned the oligarchic
control and lack of democratic accountability of most traditional union leaderships,
and  opened  a  public  debate  on  renewing  the  very  model  of  Argentina’s  union
organisation  dating  back  to  the  mid-1940s  (Vocos,  2010).  However  much  an
important development, this cannot hide the significant decline in and uneven nature
of workplace union representation. In 2004, only 12% of formal sector enterprises had
shop stewards,  although in  companies  with more  than 200 employees,  this  figure
reaches 53% (Trajtemberg and Attorresi, 2005).
Conclusions
As this brief chapter has suggested, a more systematic comparative analysis of Chile
and  Argentina  may  contribute  to  address  a  number  of  broader  theoretical  and
empirical  issues.  First,  the  comparison  illustrates  how  the  breakdown  and
reconstruction of employment relations institutions results from changing patterns of
accumulation and the contentious interaction of class actors (Howell, 2005). Chile and
Argentina have undergone broadly similar trajectories in their patterns of economic
development,  from  laissez-faire to  ISI,  and  from  ISI  to  neoliberal  restructuring.
However,  the  milieus  of  political,  economic,  and  social  adjustments  that  have
developed under these models have differed significantly between the two countries.
While there have been strong common variables involved, concrete national realities
have played a fundamental role in shaping the contours of change, continuity,  and
struggle  (Patroni and Poitras, 2002). This has been particularly evident in terms of
different political systems, economic structure, the nature and timing of initial labour
legislation,  the  pattern  of  relationship  between  labour  and  the  state  and  political
parties, and the varying strength and organisation of employment relations actors.
Second, the traditional models of employment relations that accompanied ISI
in  both  countries  have  undergone  major  transformation.  As  elsewhere,  the
exclusionary nature of the current pattern of accumulation –greatly associated with
the notion of ‘globalisation’- has resulted in a tendency to the recommodification of
labour, with dominant patterns of labour regulation becoming increasingly sensitive to
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the prevailing balance of economic and political  power  (Contu and Murray, 2005;
Western, 1998).
The  most  noticeable  impact  of  neoliberal  restructuring  in  individual
employment  relations  in  Chile  and Argentina  has  been the  significant  increase  in
atypical forms of employment, precariousness, informality, and inequality. Although
these problems are certainly not new, the current tendency represents a reverse of the
historical  trend  toward  increasing  levels  of  formal  good-quality  employment  and
social  mobility.  Amongst  other  consequences,  the  high  level  of  informal  work
undermines  the  validity  of  analyses  based  exclusively  on  the  formal  system  of
institutions and actors regulating the employment relationship. This also compels to
rethink  the  prospects  of  extending  protective  employment  legislation  to  the  vast
majority of the population and the potential role of trade unions in its promotion.
Organised labour has suffered a major setback in both countries as a result of
the imposition of neoliberalism. In general, unions’ capacity to affect the political and
economic  transformations  on  course,  protect  hard  won  rights,  and  organise  an
increasingly heterogeneous working class has been limited, but their decline has been
significantly more pronounced in Chile than in Argentina. In both cases however, the
drop in formal employment has created a radically different situation for organised
labour.  Indeed,  as Patroni and Poitras  (2002) argue,  developing new strategies  for
organising workers in the informal economy will require not only a new capacity to
experiment  beyond  traditional  practices,  but  also  the  overcoming  of  some  very
concrete barriers emerging from the growing disparities in working experiences. 
Fourth,  despite  the  presence  of  strong  common  factors,  the  nature  and
effectiveness  of  workers  responses  has  differed  significantly  in  the  two countries.
While traditional unions in Chile engaged in social concertation and obtained meagre
results,  Argentina’s  exchanged  flexibility  for  organisational  privileges  that  have
helped them maintain important portions of power. More importantly however, the
recent  rises  in  alternative  labour  activism  in  both  countries  suggest  a  renewed
potential  for  contestation  beyond  traditional  organisations.  In  Chile,  the  ‘contract
labour  movement’ has  come  to  represent  the  hearts  and  minds  of  many  a  viable
alternative to an otherwise terminally ill labour movement. In Argentina, alternative
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organisations have promoted innovative forms of contestation and progressive forms
of unionism, especially renewing grass-roots structures and experimenting with new
forms of organising in the informal sector, have challenged traditional labour unions.
This  is  important  in  various  respects.  These  experiences  have  shown once
more that the influence of the structure of opportunity on the form and prospects of
union strategy is  not independent  of the various types of union structures through
which  workers  organise  (Frege  and  Kelly,  2003;  Kelly,  1998).  Giving  alternative
networks of activists or groups of unorganised workers a similar ontological value
than large union bureaucracies may allow us to develop more convincing arguments
about  the future of trade unionism.  Moreover,  although the above discussion may
have implied that the national and firm levels are still the main levels of analysis, it is
important  to  recognise  that  from the  1970s onwards,  this  two-fold  distinction  has
become difficult  to hold (Regalia, 2007: 2). Accepting the existence of a plurality of
levels  requires  to  empirically  deconstruct  the  account  presented  above.  Last,  the
overview presented  in  this  chapter  proves  once  more  the  centrality  of  workers  in
shaping the socio-economic processes that affect them, and the everlasting dimension
of labour unrest under capitalism. 
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